Meat + Poultry - September 2006 - 61

Q

How prepared are the nation's veterinarians and producers for an intentional/accidental event?
The USDA and APHIS have traditionally relied on a quarantine, slaughter and "ring vaccination" strategy to counter
a possible FMD outbreak. This has served us well and
would probably suffice in the event of an accidental or
poorly executed intentional FMD introduction. However,
that strategy would most probably be inadequate in the
event of a well-planned or widespread outbreak.

Q

How important is individual-animal identification in
the realm of potential bioterrorism?
Being able to accurately trace the movements of individual
animals would be extremely important in responding to
and managing a serious or foreign animal disease outbreak. Many infectious diseases have a rapid onset of disease, or an incubation period when they may be infected
but not showing significant signs or symptoms of illness. It
is probable that a terrorist introducing a highly contagious
FAD would use transportation as an efficient delivery
mechanism. In an industry characterized by extreme mobility and distribution, this would contribute to the rapid
spread of disease to many divergent locations. An effective
ID/tracking system would certainly help responders minimize the spread of infected animals and help to swiftly locate potentially infected animals or herds. This would help
reduce the overall impact of a FAD outbreak. Additionally,
being able to track movement of individual animals would
be of great value to law enforcement. This would make it
easier to identify the original crime scene and would probably improve the odds of apprehending the perpetrators.

Q

"The whole DHS agroterrorism theory doesn't hold,"
said a senior U.S. counterterrorism official in Washington. Asked if he had ever heard of a credible terrorist
threat to the food supply, the official laughingly replied,
"Never." What is your response to this?
With all due respect, I view this statement as shortsighted
and parochial. I would agree that we should prioritize our
counterterrorism efforts to address human-health vulnerabilities; however, there clearly is a credible agroterrorism
threat based on several factors: effective agents that require little or no sophisticated delivery or state-sponsored
technology are readily accessible, there are many potential
vulnerable targets that would pose little to no risk to a
perpetrator, and the resultant impacts of an attack could
be large-scale and dramatic. In my view, it is a potential
recipe for disaster. He may well be implying that an agroterrorism event would not result in our citizens going hungry. I would agree completely with him on this issue, since

we have an exceptionally productive and diverse engine
for producing foods that is unlikely to be totally disrupted. However, there is more to agroterrorism than whether

THE POTENTIAL NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
IMPACTS OF A WELL-PLANNED AND
WELL-EXECUTED AGROTERRORISM
ATTACK COULD CERTAINLY
HAVE DIRE AND FAR-REACHING
CONSEQUENCES.
there is steak or chicken available at the supermarket. The
potential national economic and psychological impacts of
a well-planned and well-executed agroterrorism attack
could certainly have dire and far-reaching consequences. I
would suspect that he has little appreciation for the complex interrelated economic underpinnings of our agricultural infrastructure and for the potential economic effects
a successful agroterrorism attack could have on sectors
seemingly unrelated to agriculture.

Q

What is the most important next step for the agriculture industry to take?
A partial list of next steps might include: improved education and awareness of all stakeholders of the issues and
possible vulnerabilities - meetings like the ISA are helping in this regard; training, planning and coordination at
the local level - a major agroterrorism event will probably be managed locally and/or at the state level; improving physical and biosecurity at vulnerable nodes and enhancing response capabilities; beefing up R&D facilities
and programs that are needed to develop effective countermeasures such as treatments, vaccines, detectors, diagnostic tests, genetically resistant crops and or animals, protective equipment; improve training and coordination of
possible responders, law enforcement, veterinarians and
public-health personnel; develop new and improve existing disease and syndromic surveillance programs and
technologies; develop and incorporate use of new tools
such as GPS technology; review domestic and international policies to ensure that they do not inadvertently contribute to vulnerabilities or liabilities; and more effectively
integrate public-health and responder communities with
agricultural entities so that emergency planning and response will include both groups.

SEPTEMBER 2006 FOOD SYSTEMS ınsıder FSI

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Meat + Poultry - September 2006

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