Meat + Poultry - September 2006 - 60

FSI Q& A

Addressing agroterrorism: threats and action
Jerry Jaax is Kansas State University's associate vice provost
for research compliance and the university veterinarian.
He previously served 26 years with the U.S. Army Veterinary Corps. His assignments included chief of veterinary
medicine and laboratory support for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense and chief of
the veterinary medicine division for the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.

Why attack U.S. agriculture?
The simplistic answer - agriculture is a "soft target." In practical terms, this means that major segments
of our agricultural infrastructure have significant vulnerabilities, are largely unprotected, and a successful attack
could have significant to drastic consequences. It is believed that extremists have considered many ways to attack or negatively affect our national, collective and individual security. Indeed, they had spectacular success in
the 9/11 attacks. Further activities could include using
physical means or a raft of disease agents, undermining
national will and/or confidence in the government, or
causing substantial damage to the economy. Certainly,
significant opportunities exist within the agricultural sector for would-be perpetrators to accomplish all of these
diverse goals.
Agriculture - ranging from pre-harvest production
in the field or orchard through post-harvest processing
and distribution to the table - is so diverse and decentralized that it is virtually impossible to provide total protection for all equities. This diversity is a significant strength
in that we do not totally rely on any individual segment,
but it also contributes to security vulnerabilities.

Who in the food system is most vulnerable to attack
(i.e. milk producers, beef/pork/chicken producers,
crop farmers, processors/packers, retail/foodservice)?
All of the entities listed above could be vulnerable to
some kind of attack. The questions are: What are the
means and opportunities available to perpetrate an attack, and where could the most damage be done? Obviously, an incident that would cause the death or serious
illness of a large number of people would have a greater
national impact than the introduction of a strictly animal
or plant disease that would have more of an economic
impact. These questions really have to be evaluated in
terms of risk: What is the intended target? What agents
are available? What is the delivery system? Are there feasible countermeasures available? Is there effective physical security or deterrence? What is the realistic or intended outcome for the attacker?

10 FSI

FOOD SYSTEMS

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SEPTEMBER 2006

What is the biggest threat to
U.S. agriculture?
I think foot and mouth disease certainly has characteristics that make
it the most challenging threat agent
for agriculture. The good news -
there has not been an outbreak of
FMD in the U.S. since 1929, and it is
not a zoonotic disease, so it does
Jerry Jaax
not pose a known health threat to
humans (or perpetrators). However,
FMD represents the "perfect storm"
for an agricultural and economic terrorist threat to the
U.S. We have a highly efficient food-animal industry that
utilizes intensive production methods, great concentrations of animals and extreme mobility of animals and
materials. These factors play well into the transmission
and disease characteristics of FMD. It is a highly contagious virus affecting cloven-hoofed animals (cattle,
sheep, swine, deer, etc.) with a short incubation period
of several days that results in rapid spread and a high
morbidity (infection) rate. It is relatively persistent in the
environment and is one of the few biological pathogens
that can be easily transmitted in a true aerosol (through
the air reportedly for miles) without sophisticated statesponsored delivery or weaponization technology. It also
is readily transmitted by direct contact, droplets and/or
fomites (inanimate objects like shoes, vehicles, etc).
There is an inapparent carrier state that makes FMD difficult to eradicate without mass depopulations of all potentially infected animals, and there are many strains
and subtypes along with other factors that make development of effective vaccines and vaccination strategies
problematic. In addition to the direct costs of response
and eradication, arrival of the disease in the U.S. would
immediately impact export of meat products to FMDfree countries, causing a significant trade problem (11
percent of U.S. beef is exported). Perhaps most importantly, FMD is naturally occurring in parts of Asia, Africa
and South America, making it relatively attainable for
would-be perpetrators. Thoughtful smuggling of the virus into the U.S. would be virtually impossible to prevent,
and infection of cattle or swine with FMD and subsequent spread to national herds would be probable. Simulations have shown that the ultimate impact of a wellplanned introduction could involve tens of millions of
animals, and billions of dollars. A successful FMD attack
would be potentially catastrophic to an important pillar
of our economy with significant systemic economic ripple
effects in non-agricultural sectors.

Meat + Poultry - September 2006

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